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Introduction
In this paper we will consider two classical problems concerning distributed systems, under the assumption that some sites or some processes can possibly have a faulty behavior.
The first one is the naming problem and the second one the mutual exclusion problem.
We will briefly present them and discuss about the assumptions that we make.
Almost all distributed algorithms assume as a precondition that each site has a unique identifier. Under usual hypotheses, giving each site an identifier is straightforward, even if each site does not know about the entire network. For example, a circulating token containing an integer can perform a traversal of the network, starting with the value 1, and increasing it by 1, each time it leaves a site for the first time [6] . Each site chooses as its unique identifier the integer in the token at its first arrival. This method, like some other methods (cf. [4, 111 , depends on the fact that each site transmits the token and increases its value correctly. If a given site decreases the value of the token instead of increasing it, two (correct) sites would receive the same identifier. And what about a site keeping the token forever!
In this paper, we will be interested in the (non-trivial) problem of giving each site a unique identifier, assuming that some sites can have byzantine behavior [7] . That means that, roughly speaking, the bad sites can perform anything: sending false messages or not sending messages at all, having a correct behavior, stopping and then restarting, etc. A site that permanently follows its protocol is called correct Without some supplementary-rather strong-assumptions, the naming problem has no solution. We will not present a formal treatment yielding results of indecidability, but simply describe the wrong situations that can possibly occur.
Firstly, let us consider the network in Fig. 1 . If the site s can only communicate with the rest of the network through the byzantine site byz, it cannot necessarily distinguish between the situation above and the situation in Fig. 2 .
Thus, if a deterministic algorithm for solving the naming problem would exist, it would have to give s an identifier independent of those given to the n other sites. Then the uniqueness of the identifiers would not be ensured.
n sites Such a paradox also appears when a site is "surrounded" by byzantine sites or when two or more correct sites cannot communicate without avoiding a byzantine one. So, we are naturally led to an assumption about the connectivity degree of the network. Let k be a strict upper bound to the number of possible byzantine processes. We will assume that the network is k-connected. That is there are at least k+ 1 disjoint paths connecting two correct sites. Among these k+ 1 disjoint paths, at least one goes through only correct processes.
The most general and difficult hypothesis about message passing is asynchrony.
When the network is not known, asynchrony does not allow to detect the termination of an algorithm. We will assume here that each site knows an upper bound to the diameter of the network. The third assumption concerns asymmetry of the sites. The naming problem has no solution even if all sites are correct, if the sites are perfectly symmetrical and, therefore, indistinguishable.
In order to prove that ab absurdo, consider the network of Fig. 3 , in which the two sites are identical. Since the two sites follow the same protocol at the same time, they receive the same information from the other and then choose the same identifier. So we will assume that there exists a particular site, the initiator, that starts the naming algorithm. Each site knows whether it is the initiator or not, and there is a unique initiator. We assume that the initiator is always correct and that the messages it sends are authenticated.
This requirement can be achieved, for instance, by a cryptographic digital signature [lo] . The problem of the mutual exclusion is another classical problem concerning the synchronization of concurrent or distributed processes. Each process is given with a special part of its code, called the critical section and a protocol must be designed, to ensure that, at any time, at most one process is executing inside its critical section.
Moreover, the protocol must yield some fairness, absence of starvation and deadlock requirements.
This problem appears, in particular, when an exclusive access to a resource, like a printer, must be imposed.
In a large network, with a number of host computers, the correctness of all the processes running in the network cannot be guaranteed at the same level. For instance, processes running on micro-computers or small computers are supposed to be less reliable than those on large mainframes, where a control system does exist. But the mutual exclusion condition for some access must be guaranteed, whatever the processes do. Some solutions to the problem of mutual exclusion have been presented in the case of crash faults [9, 3] .). But, in contrast with crash faults, a faulty byzantine process cannot generally be detected. The difficulty is thus to design a protocol that deals with byzantine faults.
It is not hard to see that such a protocol does not exist for the mutual exclusion problem and that supplementary assumptions must be made, in order to obtain partial solutions. The main difficulty that we are faced to is: when a correct process is executing in its critical section, how can we avoid that a faulty process enters its own critical section? The idea for solving it is to use a mechanism analogous to a capability.
If the critical section is implemented as a separate segment and if the access to this segment requires the knowledge of its address, this address should be given to any process only under distributed control. In our solution, a process wanting to enter its critical section must reconstruct the required address from pieces of information sent by the other processes, after they have agreed on him. Schematically, the protocol for a process is:
l ask the other processes for their pieces of information for reconstructing the address of the critical section segment, l wait until this address can be reconstructed, l enter the critical section, then leave it, l send acknowledgments to all other processes (the exit section). In this paper, we will consider processes that can exhibit byzantine behavior everywhere in their code, except during the execution of some special parts of the protocol, namely the critical and the exit sections. We will call such processes, as in [2] , locally byzantine processes. Note that this hypothesis is absolutely necessary for avoiding a byzantine process to remain forever in its critical section or not to notify its exiting to the other processes.
The naming problem with faulty processes

Preliminaries
Let Gi, 1 <i< n be processes.
Assume that every Gi can directly exchange messages with some other GJ (its neighbors), that message passing is synchronous and that no message is modified or lost. Gi only knows about its neighbors and nothing else about the network topology. Assume topology is fixed. The naming problem is to design a protocol Pi that G, may use to obtain a unique identifier. The protocol P, involves exchanging messages with its neighbors. As long as G, computes according to Pi, it is called correct. Once a process G, deviates from Pi, it becomes faulty (or byzantine) and is considered to remain faulty, even if, later on, it reverts back to following Pt.
Initially, each site knows its adjacent communication lines and knows them by a local name (a number).
We also assume that a particular process has the role of initiating the protocols. So each process initially knows whether it is the initiator or not. The initiator is assumed to be correct.
At the end, we suppose that there is a public key cryptographic system, allowing the initiator to use a digital signature [lo] . Let (T be the digital signature of the initiator and a(m) a signed message.
The protocol
We will first sketch how the protocol works. At the beginning, the initiator numbers its neighbors and for all numbers i, sends to i the (signed) message cT("initialization", i). Each neighbor, receiving such a message, checks for the digital signature of the initiator (in case of failure, the message is rejected), numbers its own neighbors, for each of them concatenates the number to the message, then sends it to the related neighbor.
Such a message has the form (cT("initialization", i),j), where j is the neighbor number. In a general manner, we call valid any message endorsed by the digital signature of the initiator. During the whole protocol, correct sites only accept valid messages.
When a correct site s receives a valid message, it knows how its neighbor has numbered the communication line between them. If this number is j and if s has itself numbered the communication line by i, s registers that iC' = j. If, after this first numbering, s receives from the same neighbor conflicting information about the number of the line, it simply does not accept any other message from this neighbor.
The first time a correct site s receives a valid message, it starts a watchdog timer, initialized to the value 3 * D * 6, where v is the maximum transmission delay between two adjacent sites (recall that message passing is synchronous and D is the network diameter).
At this point, it should be noticed that byzantine sites can possibly relay messages endorsed by the initiator, after having modified some unencoded information. In the sequel, each site receiving a valid initialization message relays it to its numbered neighbors, after having appended its number to the message. Moreover, each site manages a list, containing the valid messages already received. Each time a valid message is accepted, the list is searched to check that the message is not a looping message (more precisely, it is searched whether a left prefix of the message is already in the list, as a complete message). Looping messages are rejected. So correct sites progressively delete valid messages. It should be noticed that a correct site can possibly accept and relay a message that contains false information. Figure 4 shows such a situation. The first byzantine site receives a("initialization", 3) from the initiator. It relays it to the other byzantine site without change. This one appends 1 and sends the message (a("initialization", 3), 1) to the correct site. So, s can think that the network is as in Fig. 5 . Now, we introduce the notion of conjirmation. Each time a site accepts a valid message, it returns to the initiator a return message, by the reverse path. For that it uses the inverse of the numbers of its outgoing communications lines as registered previously, cf. Fig. 6 . As a matter of fact, the actual reverse path is followed only if the message does not go through a byzantine site deviating it. A return message is identical to an initialization message, except that it has a first field "return" (unsigned). A return message is relayed by the correct sites toward the initiator and a pointer shows at what step the message has arrived. For instance,
is a return message that has followed back a line numbered 2-l and a line numbered 3-l.
Each time the initiator receives a return message, it erases the fields "return" and "initialization", signs the rest of the message, adds the message in clear with a pointer on the first number and a field "confirmation".
For instance, such a confirmation message is:
Then the confirmation message is transmitted by the correct sites, according to the included path, until arriving at the destination.
At each step, the digital signature of the initiator is checked. Moreover, the point is checked and updated, indicating at what step the message has arrived. For instance, this is a circulating confirmation message:
indicating that, from the initiator, the message has followed the lines 3, 1,3 and 3 and that the destination will be reached by following line 2. When a confirmation message arrives at its destination, the site checks the digital signature of the initiator, checks whether or not the message is already in its list of valid messages and, if so, stores the value of the path in a table. After the delay 3 * D * 6, a correct site stops and concatenates in a string all the values of paths that are stored in the table (using a separator).
Then it chases the result of the concatenation as an identifier. Now, we present a more precise formulation of the protocols. Some data structures and primitive are presented in Appendix A. The symbol "!" denotes the marked catenation of strings (catenation with a marker insertion). 
end endo upon timer expiration do stop endo end;
We now prove that the protocols are correct. All protocols do terminate, since the clock interrupts have a finite delay.
Lemma 1. Any correct process receives at least one initialization message and one con$rmation message with the same path information that has only passed through correct processes.
Proof. The graph is k + 1 connected.
Then there exist k + 1 disjoint paths leading from the initiator to any correct process. Among them, at least one does not contain any faulty process (recall that there are at most k faulty processes). 0
We call normal for Pi any message that has gone only through correct processes between the initiator and Pi. Lemma 1 states that any correct process receives normal initialization and confirmation messages. Moreover, any message normal for Pi is valid for Pi. Proof. Since the identifier consists of the concatenation of valid messages separated by a marker, they differ, by Lemma 4, by at least one message. 0
Complexity
Let m be the maximum degree of the graph (maximum number of outgoing lines from a site). Since each correct process stops after the delay 3 * D * 6 (II is the diameter of the graph) and sends at most m messages per 6 time units, for each accepted message, an upper bound of the total number of exchanged messages is 3*D*mD.
The time complexity is obviously 3 * D * 8.
The mutual exclusion problem with faulty processes
Preliminaries
Let G,, 1~ i < n be processes.
Assume that every G, can directly exchange messages with every other G,, that communications are asynchronous and that, whenever a process Gi sends a message to G,, the message eventually reaches G,.
Each G, executes a program, that has a section of code, called its critical section. When one process is executing in its critical section, no other process is allowed to execute in its own critical section. The critical section problem is to design a protocol Pi, which Gi may use to cooperate. The protocol P, involves exchanging messages with other G,'s, deciding when to enter the critical section and when to wait for entering it. As long as G, computes according to Pi, it is called correct. Once a process Gi deviates from Pi, it becomes faulty and is considered to remain faulty, even if, later on, it reverts back to following Pi. Pi also includes the code that Gi executes to request permission to enter its critical section. The section of code implementing this request is called the entry section. The critical section is followed by an exit section. The remaining code is the remainder section, that can be divided into two parts.
A solution to the mutual exclusion problem must satisfy three requirements: (i) Mutual exclusion. If process Gi is executing in its critical section, no other process can be executing in its own critical section.
(ii) Progress. If no process is executing in its critical section and there exists some process that wishes to enter its critical section, it cannot be delayed by processes executing forever in their remainder sections. (iii) Bounded waiting. Once all processes are aware of the intention of a process G to enter its critical section, there must exist a bound on the number of times that other processes are allowed to enter their critical section before G's request is granted.
We make the important assumption that the entry and exit sections are always correctly executed, and that a process never crashes in its critical section. In any other part of its protocol, a process can become faulty. Even after becoming faulty, it correctly executes its critical and exit sections. Such a faulty process is called a locally faulty process.
The underlying idea to practically implement this assumption is that each G, must be a process executing under control of the operating system of an host computer. The critical section is implemented as a separate segment, in its own memory locations. For executing this segment, a process must necessarily know its address (for instance own a capability for the segment). In the sequel, we will drop these implementation details and keep in mind that the three sections are always correctly executed. We will also suppose that the distributed system has a public key cryptographic system, yielding digital signatures [lo] . We note ai the digital signature of the process G, and vi(m) a signed message. All messages will be implicitly signed by the sender, so that we will always omit a; and simply write m for a signed message.
The protocol
The solution that we will present uses some data structures and primitives, that will be part of each protocol (thus, variables are local to a site, but some are also global to procedures on a same site). They are given in Appendix B. The solution consists in a main program and two interrupt handlers, that are the same for all G,'s.
The main program is made of three procedures that are concurrently executed. A FIFO message buffering system is assumed to exist on each site. The procedure Listening receives the arriving messages (from the buffering system), implicitly checks that they are correctly signed and manages two information tables, ask and acq of type control.
The record ask[j] (of type note) is used to memorize the last message "ask for entering" (setting flag to the value true) with its data (the value of counter) and the corresponding value I,(s) (coded as an integer). The record acq[ j] is used to memorize the date of the last message "exit". The records ask[j] and acq[j] are both local to Gi. The fields flag are initialized to false and date and info to 0. It must be noticed that only the last messages "ask for entering" and "exit", with their dates, are saved. We consider only solutions to the problem that use finite storage. Thus, since communication is asynchronous, we cannot store all untreated messages, because their number is unbounded. The procedure Listening treats an inbound message atomically. The text of Listening is quite straightforward and we will omit it. The procedure byz_cons is used to obtain a consensus among the Gi's, on the particular G, that should be allowed to enter its critical section. It uses as a primitive the procedure byzantine-agreement of Rabin [8] , that gives the agreement with an expected number of four rounds. As in [8] a correct "dealer" is assumed to provide to each Gi an infinite sequence of shadows (in the sense of threshold schemes, cf. [5] or [12] ) of random bits. The reconstruction of the secret bit, indexed by the value of the variable cons_counter, is supposed to be part of byzantine-agreement.
An important point of Rabin's technique is that, when a process stops the agreement protocol, it has the proof that all correct processes will stop it in the same round or one round later.
The parts of the procedure represented underlined are executed atomically, at the local level. At the end, we present the two interrupt handlers, executed under the control of the local operating system. Recall that execution of a svc causes the processor status word to be put at the top of the stack. Recall that it is assumed that the two interrupt handlers are always correctly executed, by any process. Proof. The proof is based upon the three following properties of the protocol.
(a) Mutual exclusion. Assume that two processes Gi and G, are simultaneously (for a hypothetical global clock) in their own critical section. Each of them has necessarily entered its critical section by an svc, in some fixed order, for instance G, first and G, second. In order to build the address of the segment containing its critical section, G, has received at least t + 1 shadows &(s). Among those t + 1 responding processes, at least one is a correct one, G,. Since G, sent I,(s) and G, is correct, G, obtained, together with all correct processes, an agreement on Gi. Thus, each correct process is executing:
since G, is still in its critical section. Consequently, no correct process sent I,(s) to G,. So G, received at most t shadows (from incorrect processes) and, contradictory to the hypothesis, is unable to know the segment address of its critical section.
(b) Progress. Assume that G, executes a primitive svc( ask_for_critical_section) and let G, be the first process to enter its critical section after this system call.
Since the only way for a process to enter its critical section is through the Interrupt handler for svc(ask_for_critical_section), G, requested to enter its critical section.
So, Gi cannot be delayed by processes executing forever in their remainder sections. (c) Bounded waiting. Assume that the process Gi executes the primitive
suc(ask_for_critical_section).
Since there is no loss of messages, the messages (ask for entering,i,j, So Gj can enter its critical section after at most n -1 other distinct processes enter their critical sections.
Complexity
The number of exchanged messages necessary for a process that requests to enter its critical section has the same order of magnitude than the number of exchanged messages necessary for reaching a byzantine agreement and is in O(n').
Conclusion
We have first presented a method for assigning to each site of a network an unique identifier. This identifier is a rather long character string and can seem not to be of a great practical interest. Nevertheless, there do exist renaming algorithms, that allow a reduction in the size of the initial name space, even if some processes are faulty [l] and a sequel to this work should be to merge our solution with such an algorithm.
Then, we have given an authenticated solution to the mutual exclusion problem. In [13] , a methodology is given for deriving non-authenticated algorithms from algorithms using digital signatures. This methodology could possibly be applied here, giving a non-authenticated algorithm that solves the mutual exclusion problem for locally byzantine processes. begin {starting from an address s and two integers n and t, t < n, this primitive produces n pieces of information, Z,(s), Z2(s), . . . , Z,,(s), called the shadows of s, such that the knowledge of any set of at least t pieces and of no set of strictly less than t pieces allows to built s. The n shadows of s are signed by the system executing this primitive} end; Shamir [12] and Denning [5] give several methods for building this primitive. consensus); begin {reaches a byzantine agreement, by only considering messages that are timestamped by the value counter, with initial_value as initial message. The result of the agreement protocol is in jinal_value. The default value chosen for this primitive will be the string: "default value"} end; Since communications are assumed to be asychronous, this primitive can be implemented by the probabilistic solution of Rabin [8] or its improved version Toueg [ 141. These solutions guarantee exact agreement within a finite expected number of rounds, provided the number of incorrect processes does not exceed n/3 (cf.
Appendix
[14]).
